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A Conceptual Framework for the Regulation 
of Cryptocurrencies 
Omri Marian† 
INTRODUCTION 
This Essay proposes a conceptual framework for the regula-
tion of transactions involving cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies 
offer tremendous opportunities for innovation and development 
but are also uniquely suited to facilitate illicit behavior. The 
regulatory framework suggested herein is intended to support 
(or at least not impair) cryptocurrencies’ innovative potential. At 
the same time, it aims to disrupt cryptocurrencies’ criminal util-
ity. To achieve these purposes, this Essay proposes a regulatory 
framework that imposes costs on the characteristics of crypto-
currencies that make them especially useful for criminal behav-
ior (in particular, anonymity) but does not impose costs on  
characteristics that are at the core of cryptocurrencies’ genera-
tive potential (in particular, the decentralization of value-
transfer processes). Using a basic utility model of criminal be-
havior as a benchmark,1 this Essay explains how regulatory  
instruments can be so designed. One such regulatory instrument 
is proposed as an example—an elective anonymity tax on cryp-
tocurrency transactions in which at least one party is not anon-
ymous. 
There has been increasing interest in the regulation of cryp-
tocurrencies, with many inquiries focusing on the regulation of 
cryptocurrencies within discrete areas of law.2 This Essay  
 
 † Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. For help-
ful comments and critique I thank Professors Michael Abramowicz, Andrew Hayashi, 
Danny Sokol, as well as Sarah Meiklejohn and participants at the ABA Tax Section’s  
2-14 Joint Fall CLE Meeting and the 9th Annual Junior Tax Scholars Workshop. 
 1 See note 30 and accompanying text. 
 2 See generally, for example, Stephen T. Middlebrook and Sarah Jane Hughes, 
Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues and Future Directions, 
40 Wm Mitchell L Rev 813 (2014); Jerry Brito, Houman B. Shadab, and Andrea Castillo, 
Bitcoin Financial Regulation: Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling, 
16 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev (forthcoming 2014), online at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2423461 (visited Nov 26, 2014); 
Nicholas A. Plassaras, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin within the Reach 
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contributes to the discussion by suggesting a generic framework 
for the design of regulatory instruments that address cryptocur-
rencies. The suggested framework is both direct and indirect in 
its approach. It directly addresses possible incentives to use 
cryptocurrencies illicitly. Indirectly, the framework takes ad-
vantage of the unique structure of cryptocurrencies’ protocols by 
making legitimate users passive agents of regulatory efforts. 
Specifically, a derivative benefit of the suggested framework is 
that the legitimate use of cryptocurrency would have the effect 
of making cryptocurrencies systemically less suitable for illicit 
use. 
This Essay is structured as follows: Part I briefly discusses 
the core innovation of cryptocurrencies—the public ledger—and 
explains its positive potential as well as the challenges that it 
presents to traditional regulatory models. Part II introduces the 
proposed regulatory approach in the abstract, using a basic util-
ity model of criminal behavior as a linchpin for discussion. Part 
III describes an elective tax on anonymity to demonstrate how 
the suggested framework might operate in the context of tax 
evasion. Part IV discusses possible critiques of the suggested 
approach. The Essay concludes with a call for further discussion 
of this new regulatory area. 
I.  VIRTUES, VICES, AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES 
Bitcoin, a cryptocurrency3 that is best known as a peer-to-
peer electronic cash system, is touted as being as revolutionary 
as the Internet.4 The potential of Bitcoin5 and other  
 
of the IMF, 14 Chi J Intl L 377 (2013). For two recent exceptions to the field-tailored  
approach that advocate a broader view of the problem, see Andy Yee, Internet Architec-
ture and the Layers Principle: A Conceptual Framework for Regulating Bitcoin, 3 Inter-
net Pol Rev 1, 6–7 (2014); Kevin V. Tu and Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual 
Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, 90 Wash L Rev (forthcoming 2015), online at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2485550 (visited Nov 16, 2014). 
 3 I use the term “cryptocurrency” to refer to any digital currency that relies on 
peer-to-peer cryptography for the validation of value transfers. 
 4 See, for example, Bloomberg TV, Here’s How Bitcoin Is Like the Early ’90s Inter-
net (Mar 28, 2014), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/video/here-s-how-bitcoin-is-like-
early-90-s-internet-dU0H7ADwTl6arrq122kHPg.html (visited Nov 16, 2014); Saumya 
Vaishampayan, Bitcoin Is Like the Early Internet, Minus the VC Money, Market Extra 
(MarketWatch Apr 28, 2014), online at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/bitcoin-
venture-capital-money-hasnt-kept-up-with-buzz-2014-04-28 (visited Nov 16, 2014). 
 5 The term “Bitcoin” is commonly used to refer to the technology, as opposed to 
“bitcoin,” which refers to the virtual currency that is based on the technology and repre-
sents one possible application of it. See Kate Cox, Bitcoin: What the Heck Is It, and How 
Does It Work?, Consumerist (Mar 4, 2014), online at 
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cryptocurrencies extends beyond their applications as units of 
account or mediums of exchange. Rather, the unique technologi-
cal innovation common to most cryptocurrencies is a public ledg-
er that functions as a decentralized system for recording owner-
ship and value transfers. While the technical operation of the 
ledger is complex,6 the core idea is rather simple. When an own-
er of a cryptocurrency (which can be described as an electronic 
token) transfers the cryptocurrency to a recipient, the transac-
tion is verified in a process called “mining.” A crowd of “miners” 
consults the ledger, verifies the owner’s claim of ownership, and 
documents the transfer to the recipient, who from now on is 
logged on the ledger as the owner of the cryptocurrency. The ver-
ification process is a competitive one. The miners do not simply 
verify the transaction; they compete to solve a complex crypto-
graphic problem. The first miner to succeed wins the competi-
tion, logs the transaction on the ledger, and is awarded a new 
batch of cryptocurrencies. The new batch of cryptocurrencies is 
automatically generated by the software and functions both as 
an incentive to participate in the mining process7 and as a de-
centralized mechanism for the issuance of new cryptocurrencies. 
Anyone can become a miner by downloading the necessary soft-
ware. Cryptocurrency software is open-source and generally not 
controlled by a central entity.8 
To summarize, cryptocurrencies are essentially protocols 
that allow for the validation of transactions without the need for 
a trusted third party such as a bank, credit card company, es-
crow agent, or recording agency.9 As such, cryptocurrencies hold 
great innovative potential. They have been described as a “gen-
erative” technology on which powerful applications can be 
built.10 For example, cryptocurrencies may dramatically reduce 
 
http://consumerist.com/2014/03/04/bitcoin-what-the-heck-is-it-and-how-does-it-work (vis-
ited Nov 16, 2014). 
 6 For a thorough explanation of the verification process, see Ritchie S. King, Sam 
Williams, and David Yanofsky, By Reading This Article, You’re Mining Bitcoins, Quartz 
(Dec 17, 2013), online at http://qz.com/154877/by-reading-this-page-you-are-mining-
bitcoins (visited Nov 16, 2014). 
 7 In the alternative, miners could charge a fee for verifying the transaction. 
 8 See King, Williams, and Yanofsky, By Reading This Article, You’re Mining  
Bitcoins (cited in note 6). 
 9 Brito, Shadab, and Castillo, 16 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev at *5 (cited in note 2). 
 10 The term “generative” is used here in the sense suggested by Jonathan Zittrain, 
who describes generativity as “a function of a technology’s capacity for leverage across a 
range of tasks, adaptability to a range of different tasks, ease of mastery, and accessibil-
ity.” Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 Harv L Rev 1975, 1981 (2006). 
For a reference to Bitcoin as a “generative” technology, see, for example, Timothy B. Lee, 
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transaction costs associated with value transfers,11 engender ac-
cess to financial transactions within sectors of the population 
that do not have access to traditional financial institutions,12 
avoid the pitfalls of managed or commodity-based monetary sys-
tems,13 and allow for the creation of self-enforcing smart con-
tracts that do not rely on financial institutions, lawyers, or ac-
countants for their execution.14 
However, cryptocurrencies are also uniquely suited to facili-
tate harmful behaviors for two reasons.15 First, the only truly 
public feature of the ledger is the documentation of ownership 
and transfers. The owners themselves are not identified by 
name on the ledger, but rather by a set of letters and numbers 
representing their public cryptocurrency address (which, togeth-
er with the private key that proves ownership of that address, 
constitute the owner’s cryptocurrency “wallet”).16 Anyone can 
freely create as many wallets as he or she desires, at practically 
zero cost, without providing any identifying information.17 This 
relatively high level of anonymity makes it difficult for regula-
tors to identify individuals who use the protocol for illicit value 
transfers. 
 
Here’s What Critics Miss about Bitcoin’s Long-Term Potential, The Switch (Wash Post 
Dec 3, 2013), online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2013/12/03/heres-what-critics-miss-about-bitcoins-long-term-potential (visited 
Nov 16, 2014).  
 11 See Jerry Brito and Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin: A Primer for Policymakers 10 (Mer-
catus 2013). 
 12 See id at 14–15 (discussing how bitcoin can improve financial access as a means 
to fight poverty). 
 13 See George Selgin, Synthetic Commodity Money *11 (University of Georgia 
Working Paper, Apr 2013), online at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000118 (visited Nov 16, 2014). 
 14 Brito and Castillo, Bitcoin at 16 (cited in note 11); Vitalik Buterin, DAOs Are Not 
Scary, Part 1: Self-Enforcing Contracts and Factum Law, Bitcoin Magazine (Feb 24, 
2014), online at http://bitcoinmagazine.com/10468/daos-scary-part-1-self-enforcing-
contracts-factum-law (visited Nov 16, 2014). 
 15 A recent report by the Europol, for example, suggests that cryptocurrencies “are 
heavily abused by criminals.” Europol, The Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
(iOCTA) *42 (2014), online at 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/europol_iocta_web.pdf (vis-
ited Nov 16, 2014).  
 16 See Bitcoin, Some Bitcoin Words You Might Hear, online at 
https://bitcoin.org/en/vocabulary#private-key (visited Nov 20, 2014). 
 17 See Omri Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 112 Mich L Rev 
First Impressions 38, 42 (2013). 
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It should be noted, however, that most cryptocurrencies are 
not completely anonymous, but rather are pseudonymous.18 For 
example, if the identity of some wallet owners is known, it is 
theoretically possible to use these known nodes in the system to 
build a “transaction graph” that tracks each particular crypto-
currency. By doing so, one could expose the identity of owners of 
unknown wallets with which the known wallets transacted.19 
However, this technique requires complex analysis and concen-
trated effort that may be worthwhile only when a particular 
wallet is suspected of engaging in illicit activity. 
The second reason that cryptocurrencies are suited for crim-
inal activity is that our financial-regulation system heavily re-
lies on regulating intermediaries that are uniquely positioned to 
disrupt misconduct. For example, we subject financial institu-
tions to “know-your-costumer rules” in order to prevent money 
laundering, use banks as tax-withholding agents to prevent tax 
evasion,20 and regulate securities exchanges to protect investors. 
Some commentators argue that the public ledger has the poten-
tial to “eliminate intermediaries without eliminating the under-
lying conduct.”21 If that is the case, then regulators would lose 
the ability to use intermediaries as regulatory agents.22 In theo-
ry, this would necessitate the regulation of dispersed crowds—
meaning direct regulation of individuals who participate in fi-
nancial markets. Such regulation is immensely costly—a prob-
lem exacerbated by the fact that the users, as explained above, 
are relatively anonymous. The combination of anonymity and 
the decentralization of financial dealings presents governments 
with formidable regulatory challenges. 
 
 18 See Craig K. Elwell, M. Maureen Murphy, and Michael V. Seitzinger, Bitcoin: 
Questions, Answers, and Analysis of Legal Issues *3 (Congressional Research Service Ju-
ly 15, 2014), online at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43339.pdf (visited Nov 16, 2014). 
 19 See generally Malte Möser, Anonymity of Bitcoin Transactions: An Analysis of 
Mixing Services (University of Münster Working Paper, 2013), online at 
https://www.wi.uni-muenster.de/sites/default/files/public/department/itsecurity/mbc13/ 
mbc13-moeser-paper.pdf (visited Nov 16, 2014). See also Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir, 
Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Transaction Graph, in Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, 
ed, Financial Cryptography and Data Security 6 (Springer 2013). 
 20 See Europol, iOCTA at *42 (cited in note 15); IRS, Withholding Agent, (Nov 14, 
2014), online at http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Withholding-
Agent (visited Nov 18, 2014). 
 21 Brito, Shadab, and Castillo, 16 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev at *71 (cited in note 2). 
 22 See Yee, 3 Internet Pol Rev at 4–5 (cited in note 2). 
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Some skepticism about the elimination of intermediaries 
from cryptocurrency markets is warranted, however.23 Interme-
diaries are market-created, not government-created, constructs. 
Intermediaries do not just serve as agents for buyers and sellers 
but in fact add value to financial markets.24 The cryptocurrency 
market demands the creation of new financial intermediaries to 
serve it. Such intermediaries include exchanges of cryptocurren-
cies to fiat currencies, cryptocurrency-wallet service providers, 
and clearinghouses for cryptocurrency transactions.25 These new 
intermediaries can be subjected to traditional models of inter-
mediary regulation, and indeed they have been. For example, 
the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network subjects 
certain cryptocurrency service providers to regulations as money 
transmitters,26 the IRS requires certain cryptocurrency clearing 
organizations to provide information to the IRS and their service 
recipients,27 and the New York State Department of Financial 
Services recently proposed rules that would require registration 
and licensing for certain cryptocurrency financial services pro-
viders.28 This Essay proceeds under the assumption that many 
new intermediaries would be subjected to traditional regulatory 
models. The main contribution of this Essay is in the context of 
transactions in which traditional intermediaries may become 
obsolete. 
 
 23 See David S. Evans, Economic Aspects of Bitcoin and Other Decentralized Public-
Ledger Currency Platforms *14–16 (University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for 
Law and Economics Research Paper No 685, Apr 15, 2014), online at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2424516 (visited Nov 19, 2014). 
 24 See generally Franklin Allen and Anthony M. Santomero, What Do Financial 
Intermediaries Do?, 25 J Bank & Fin 271 (2001). For the role of intermediaries in the 
context of online markets, see generally George M. Giaglis, Stefan Klein, and Robert M. 
O’Keefe, The Role of Intermediaries in Electronic Marketplaces: Developing a Contingen-
cy Model, 12 Info Systems J 231 (2002). 
 25 See Tyler Moore and Nicolas Christin, Beware of the Middleman: Empirical 
Analysis of Bitcoin-Exchange Risk, in Sadeghi, ed, Financial Cryptography 25, 26 (cited 
in note 19). 
 26 US Department of Treasury, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons 
Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies *3 (FinCEN Mar 18, 2013), 
online at http://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf (visited Nov 
19, 2014). 
 27 IRS, Notice 2014-21 *5–6 (Mar 25, 2014), online at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
drop/n-14-21.pdf (visited Nov 19, 2014). 
 28 See New York Department of Financial Services, Proposed New York Codes, 
Rules and Regulations: Virtual Currencies *6 (July 17, 2014), online at 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press2014/pr1407171-vc.pdf (visited Nov 16, 2014). 
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II.  CRYPTOCURRENCIES AND THE UTILITY OF CRIMINAL 
BEHAVIOR 
A. Basic Assumptions 
This Essay argues that regulation should not prevent cryp-
tocurrencies from achieving their positive potential. On the oth-
er hand, regulation should prevent cryptocurrencies from be-
coming a vehicle for criminal activity. Therefore, regulation of 
cryptocurrencies should not treat any cryptocurrency as a  
homogeneous instrument. Rather, the idea is to deconstruct 
cryptocurrencies into their unique traits, dealing with their vic-
es and virtues separately. For example, decentralization is a 
positive trait that should not be disrupted. Anonymity should be 
targeted only to the extent that it increases the likelihood that 
individuals use cryptocurrencies to engage in criminal behavior. 
Accordingly, this Essay proceeds under the following as-
sumptions and qualifications: First, the current level of criminal 
activity in the market is taken as a benchmark. Regulating 
cryptocurrencies is not intended to reduce the current level of 
criminal activity but rather to ensure that cryptocurrencies do 
not increase criminal activity. Second, it is assumed that finan-
cial anonymity has an independent normative appeal even 
though it may facilitate criminal behavior.29 The current status 
of financial anonymity is taken as a benchmark—any regulatory 
framework should not decrease the current level of financial an-
onymity. However, regulation is also not aimed at increasing the 
level of anonymity. Finally, the regulatory framework assumes 
that, if no new regulatory costs are imposed on the legitimate 
use of cryptocurrencies, the market will allow the new technolo-
gy to develop to the extent that it offers benefits (other than an-
onymity) that fiat currencies do not. 
B. Addressing the Utility of Cryptocurrencies in Criminal 
Behavior 
Under the classic utility model of criminal behavior sug-
gested by Professor Gary S. Becker, a rational, profit-seeking 
 
 29 See Jim Harper, Removing Impediments to Bitcoin’s Success: A Risk Manage-
ment Study *5 (Bitcoin Foundation Research Brief No 1, 2014), online at 
https://bitcoinfoundation.org/static/2014/04/Bitcoin-Risk-Management-Study-Spring-
2014.pdf (visited Nov 19, 2014).  
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individual will engage in criminal behavior if the utility of doing 
so is greater than zero (that is, greater than not engaging in 
criminal behavior).30 In calculating the expected utility, an indi-
vidual considers the expected gain from illicit behavior, the 
probability of being sanctioned, and the cost of any sanction that 
may be imposed.31 
As noted above, the current level of criminal activity in the 
market is taken as a benchmark. This means that all individu-
als have already calculated their expected utility from criminal 
behavior and are either engaged or not engaged in criminal ac-
tivity. The regulatory framework advanced in this Essay strives 
to maintain the current level of criminal behavior. 
Assume now that cryptocurrencies are introduced. An indi-
vidual who had previously calculated negative utility from en-
gaging in criminal behavior using fiat currencies—and therefore 
was not engaged in criminal activity—is now presented with the 
option to use cryptocurrencies. Using cryptocurrencies to facili-
tate the previously contemplated illicit activity significantly re-
duces the probability of being sanctioned due to the anonymity 
associated with cryptocurrencies. Thus, if an individual expects 
to extract the same value from illicit behavior—meaning that 
the only difference is the denomination of the illicit gain—the 
utility function produces a greater expected outcome.32 
Consequently, individuals who had previously calculated 
negative utility from engaging in criminal behavior might now 
calculate positive utility solely because the illicit activity is exe-
cuted through the use of cryptocurrencies. Thus, in the absence 
of a regulatory response, a simple utility model predicts that the 
introduction of cryptocurrencies would increase the level of crim-
inal activity, because more individuals would engage in it. 
 
 30 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J Pol 
Econ 169, 176 (1968). 
 31 Becker’s basic utility function is expressed as follows: 
 
E[U] = pU(Y – f )  + (1 – p)U(Y) 
 
Where E[U] is the expected utility from engaging in criminal behavior, p is the probabil-
ity of facing criminal sanction, Y is the value expected to be generated from the criminal 
activity, and f is the cost of the criminal sanction. See id at 177 n 16. 
 32 This assumes, of course, that the utility functions of fiat currencies and crypto-
currencies are identical, so that the utility of $X is equal to the utility of $X worth of 
cryptocurrencies. In reality, however, this assumption is probably overstated so long as 
cryptocurrencies are not widely adopted. 
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Governments’ most obvious response would be to impose a 
stricter sanction in cases of illicit activity denominated in cryp-
tocurrencies. Thus, if a criminal is sanctioned, he or she would 
face a tougher sanction if the gains were denominated in crypto-
currencies than if the same gains were denominated in fiat cur-
rencies. This could theoretically equate the utility of using cryp-
tocurrencies with the utility of using fiat currencies in criminal 
activity. In such a case, the decision whether to engage in crimi-
nal behavior should not change on account of using cryptocur-
rencies versus fiat currencies, and the level of criminal activity 
would be maintained. 
There are several problems, however, with imposing in-
creased sanctions on such cryptocurrency-denominated gains. 
First, this approach means that two similarly situated criminals 
may face different sanctions if one used fiat currencies and the 
other used cryptocurrencies. There is a normative difficulty with 
imposing different criminal sanctions on functionally identical 
offenses simply because the gains are denominated in different 
units of account. Second, a vast body of literature questions the 
relationship between increased sanctions and the expected de-
terrence effect on criminal behavior. Many studies suggest that 
increasing the probability of sanction has a larger deterrent ef-
fect than increasing the severity of a sanction.33 
However, increased sanction is not the only course of action 
that governments can take. The discussion thus far has as-
sumed that the utility function of fiat currencies is identical to 
that of cryptocurrencies. Governments are in a position to alter 
this reality. For example, governments could design a quantity 
regulation that limits the ability of certain institutions to deal in 
cryptocurrencies.34 When major market participants do not 
transact in cryptocurrencies, criminals are limited in their abil-
ity to use their illicit gains. In the alternative, governments 
could create price regulations that impose certain costs on  
dealings in cryptocurrencies in the open economy. For example, 
it is possible to impose a sales tax on certain cryptocurrency 
transactions when at least one of the parties to the transaction 
 
 33 See, for example, Becker, 76 J Pol Econ at 176 (cited in note 30). 
 34 China, for example, has banned certain financial institutions from handling 
cryptocurrency transactions. See China Bans Financial Companies from Bitcoin Trans-
actions, (Bloomberg News Dec 5, 2013), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
12-05/china-s-pboc-bans-financial-companies-from-bitcoin-transactions.html (visited Nov 
19, 2014). 
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is known to the government and can therefore be the target of 
an enforcement action. This would force criminals to internalize 
excess costs when disposing of their illicit gains in the open 
economy. 
Such regulatory impediments on the use of cryptocurrencies 
would make the expected utility of $X worth of a cryptocurrency 
lower than the utility of $X. Thus, some individuals who found it 
cost-justified to engage in criminal behavior via cryptocurrencies 
before the introduction of regulation would not do so after the 
introduction of regulation, notwithstanding the fact that the 
probability of sanction would be lower. 
The obvious shortcoming of such regulatory impediments is 
that they would also apply when cryptocurrencies are used for 
legitimate purposes. If cryptocurrency transactions are subject-
ed to regulatory costs and fiat-currency transactions are not, a 
rational, law-abiding individual would never use cryptocurren-
cies. This might stifle innovation arising from cryptocurrencies. 
It would also create an adverse-selection problem—under such 
circumstances, wrongdoers are expected to be the primary 
adopters of cryptocurrencies. This is not a desirable result. 
In order to solve this problem, this Essay suggests that any 
regulatory cost associated with the use of cryptocurrencies be 
conditioned on anonymity. In essence, an individual transacting 
in cryptocurrencies in the open economy would elect between 
bearing the cost of regulation and waiving the trait that makes 
cryptocurrencies suited for illicit behavior—anonymity. For ex-
ample, merchants would be permitted to accept cryptocurren-
cies, provided that the other party to a transaction identified 
herself as the owner of the cryptocurrency address used in that 
transaction. This could be achieved by requiring purchasers to 
sign transaction receipts or by using a private identification 
number, as is done today in debit and credit card transactions. A 
stronger version of the same idea would be to prohibit the use of 
any cryptocurrency that had ever been transferred without ade-
quate disclosure35 or that had ever been associated with an un-
known public address. 
In such a case, there is no increased cost for transacting in 
cryptocurrencies compared with transacting in fiat currencies. 
However, the probability of detection of any criminal activity as-
sociated with the cryptocurrency address used to transact is no 
 
 35 I am indebted to Professor Michael Abramowicz for this innovative idea.  
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longer diminished because the owner of the address is known. 
Thus, to the extent that it is preferable to use cryptocurrencies 
for reasons that are not associated with anonymity, cryptocur-
rency use should flourish. 
Finally, under such an approach, the status quo level of fi-
nancial anonymity is maintained. The regulatory framework 
should require that cryptocurrency users who elect to avoid the 
regulatory cost provide information to the same extent as re-
quired when using other financial accounts. For example, in-
stead of providing information to a credit card company, the us-
er would be allowed to provide information directly to the 
merchant, or to a third-party clearing organization that clears 
cryptocurrency transactions for the merchant. 
Such a regulatory framework has an important derivative 
benefit. It not only addresses individuals’ incentive to use cryp-
tocurrencies for illicit purposes, but it potentially makes the 
cryptocurrency protocol as a whole less appealing for illicit us-
ers. Specifically, a unique feature of many cryptocurrencies’ pro-
tocols is that the anonymity of all users—legitimate and  
illicit—is interconnected. As explained above, if the owners of 
some addresses are known, the public ledger can be used to 
identify owners of other addresses. The more addresses that are 
identified, the easier it is to identify other addresses (if there is 
a need to do so). Thus, a regulatory framework that incentivizes 
legitimate users to give up their anonymity will produce a cas-
cade effect: the more users that identify themselves, the less 
anonymous the entire system becomes. 
Theoretically, in order for the cascade effect to be meaning-
ful, some critical mass of legitimate users would have to give up 
their anonymity in order for the system to become nonanony-
mous enough to deter illicit activity. The difficulty here is that 
the number of wallets that users can create is endless, and 
therefore additional legitimate users would have to continuously 
give up their anonymity. However, this could be mitigated if the 
fact that users voluntarily give up their anonymity is made sali-
ent. If illicit users were confronted with a reality in which other 
users give up their anonymity, then those illicit users would 
never be able to tell whether a required critical mass of  
identified users had been met. If this fact were salient enough, 
illicit users should be sufficiently discouraged from using crypto-
currencies’ protocols. Under such a framework, legitimate users 
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passively participate in regulatory efforts to prevent illicit  
behavior. 
III.  AN EXAMPLE: AN ELECTIVE ANONYMITY TAX IN 
CRYPTOCURRENCY TRANSACTIONS 
Our tax-collection system is based on individual self-
reporting. The enforcement of such reporting requirements is 
largely dependent on the regulation of intermediaries. For ex-
ample, various provisions in tax laws and regulations require fi-
nancial institutions to identify their account holders. Based on 
the identity of the account holders, these institutions may be re-
quired to withhold taxes on payments made to such account 
holders and provide information about such account holders to 
the IRS.36 The intermediaries are also required to provide the 
account holder with information necessary to complete the ac-
count holder’s own tax return, generally on an IRS Form 1099. 
However, many taxable transactions that are traditionally facil-
itated through financial institutions can theoretically rely on 
cryptocurrency protocols in order to avoid the use of a costly fi-
nancial intermediary and, as such, defeat intermediary-based 
tax enforcement.37 
For example, a consumer can use cryptocurrency the same 
way that he or she uses cash. But, unlike cash, the disposition of 
a bitcoin is a taxable transaction to the consumer.38 Under re-
cent IRS guidance, cryptocurrency is “property” in the hands of a 
taxpayer, which means that its disposition is a taxable event to 
the extent that the cryptocurrency’s value has changed since its 
acquisition by the taxpayer.39 Because no intermediaries are in-
volved, the collection of such tax is possible only to the extent 
that the taxpayer voluntarily reports such transactions. 
However, a mechanism could be instituted to incentivize 
consumers to identify themselves to a merchant or to an inter-
mediary that provides cryptocurrency clearing services. Under 
such a model, the merchant would function as a surrogate for 
the collection of what is presumed to be the purchaser’s tax  
liability in the transaction (similar to the collection of sales tax-
es). Such a model can be referred to as “surrogate  
 
 36 See Marian, 112 Mich L Rev First Impressions at 39 (cited in note 17). 
 37 See id.  
 38 See IRS, Notice 2014-21 *2 (cited in note 27). 
 39 Id.  
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presumptive collection.”40 Merchants that accept cryptocurren-
cies as a form of payment would be required to collect a special 
cryptocurrency-transaction tax based on a percentage of the 
gross value of any cryptocurrency payment and remit such tax 
to the IRS. This gross tax would be waived, however, if the con-
sumer were identified by the merchant or by an approved third-
party provider that cleared cryptocurrency payments for the 
merchant. The consumer would effectively be in a position to 
elect between avoiding the tax by disclosing his or her identity 
and paying the gross tax to maintain his or her anonymity. 
If the consumer refused to be identified, the gross tax would 
serve as a proxy for what is functionally unreported income by 
the consumer, and the consumer would be presumed to have  
satisfied any tax liability associated with the transaction. In the 
alternative, no tax would be imposed if the consumer identified 
him or herself, under the assumption that, once the consumer’s 
identity is exposed, he or she would have an incentive to proper-
ly report the income from the transaction. 
The gross tax should be set at a rate that is more likely to 
result in overcollection of taxes, so as to incentivize consumers 
to identify themselves, or otherwise force them to internalize the 
cost of their tax evasion. If the tax rate is set correctly, consum-
ers who would not have engaged in tax evasion using traditional 
payment methods should not be incentivized to do so using cryp-
tocurrencies. To the extent that cryptocurrencies offer unique 
benefits other than anonymity (such as avoiding the need to deal 
with exchange rates), consumers should opt for  
using cryptocurrencies. 
IV.  CRITIQUE 
Notwithstanding the primordial nature of the discussion, 
several critiques of the proposed framework should be noted. 
The first possible critique is a normative one: Cryptocurrencies 
offer an opportunity for increased financial anonymity, which 
can be viewed as a normatively desirable goal. However, ano-
nymity is also expected to increase the level of criminal  
activity.41 The framework presented in this Essay thus  
 
 40 The term “presumptive collection” was coined by Professor Kathleen DeLaney 
Thomas. See generally Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Presumptive Collection: A Prospect 
Theory Approach to Increasing Small Business Tax Compliance, 67 Tax L Rev 111 
(2013). 
 41 See text accompanying notes 15–19. 
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normatively rejects increased anonymity in favor of maintaining 
extant levels of criminal activity (but allows other innovative 
features of cryptocurrencies, such as decentralization). This 
choice can be criticized on ideological grounds. 
The framework can also be criticized on technical grounds. 
If individuals can create as many cryptocurrency addresses as 
they desire, then they may create different addresses for crimi-
nal and legitimate activities. Individuals who have opted to 
commit crimes will use “known” wallets for their legal activity 
and “hidden” wallets for their illegal activity. The response is 
that the utility of any cryptocurrencies in hidden addresses will 
be diminished, since hidden-wallet cryptocurrencies could be 
used only to facilitate other criminal behavior but would be 
barred from use in the open market. In order to avoid this limi-
tation, hidden cryptocurrencies would have to be moved from 
hidden to known addresses, at which point the owner of the hid-
den address could be traced using the public ledger. 
Another possible critique of the above framework is that it 
assumes a certain market structure in which multiple known 
parties adopt bitcoin. An inherent limitation of the proposed 
framework is that it is applicable only when cryptocurrencies 
are used to transact with such known parties. Theoretically, 
then, if very few known merchants adopt cryptocurrencies, the 
functionality of the regulatory framework would be limited. This 
observation should not prove particularly damaging, however, 
for three reasons. First, merchants are increasingly adopting 
cryptocurrencies. For example, over the past two years, Dell, 
Dish Network, Expedia, Overstock, and other major retailers 
have all started to accept bitcoin as a form of payment.42 These 
retailers can be a focal point of regulatory effort. Bitcoin has also 
been largely integrated into existing payment mechanisms such 
as PayPal.43 Such intermediaries can also be used as regulatory 
agents. Second, to the extent that cryptocurrencies do remain 
isolated from open markets, cryptocurrencies are unlikely to 
present a significant regulatory problem, as their economic scale 
would remain rather small. If the cryptocurrency economy is to 
 
 42 See Sydney Ember, Dell Begins Accepting Bitcoin, DealBook (NY Times July 18, 
2014), online at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/dell-begins-accepting-bitcoin 
(visited Nov 16, 2014). 
 43 See Ryan Mac, PayPal Takes Baby Step toward Bitcoin, Partners with Crypto-
currency Processors, (Forbes Sept 23, 2014), online at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2014/09/23/paypal-takes-small-step-toward-bitcoin-
partners-with-cryptocurrency-processors (visited Nov 17, 2014). 
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succeed, it must be used to interact with physical commodities 
and real services—namely, with real people who can be identi-
fied by regulators. In other words, if cryptocurrencies are not 
significantly adopted in the open market, then their utility is 
diminished compared with fiat currencies and the regulatory 
challenge remains minimal. Third, as noted above, to the extent 
that cryptocurrencies do become significant economic instru-
ments, intermediaries will emerge. “In reality, most people will 
rely on intermediaries . . . when they use [cryptocurrencies].”44 
Most users (both merchants and consumers) are not tech experts 
and will naturally turn to intermediaries to dispose of their 
cryptocurrencies. Such intermediaries can be used, for example, 
to enforce the proposed tax. 
Finally, the proposed framework could theoretically collapse 
if cryptocurrencies’ protocols become completely anonymous. 
Several projects are aimed at taking the “public” out of the “pub-
lic ledger,” making all decentralized transfers completely anon-
ymous by masking the addresses used in the transfers.45 If such 
projects are successful, it would be impossible to build a transac-
tion graph in order to trace transfers, and the entire regulatory 
approach would collapse. This Essay dismisses the idea that a 
completely anonymous financial system (that is, a system in 
which parties to a transaction are not known to each other) can 
succeed at all. It is devoid of an essential component of success-
ful financial markets: trust. Completely anonymous cryptocur-
rencies may successfully function as a unit of account among 
criminals, but not in the context of transactions that require 
trust among parties. It is doubtful that such cryptocurrencies 
can induce noncriminals to become criminals, as the utility of 
these currencies would be significantly diminished. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay decoupled cryptocurrencies into their two unique 
components: anonymity and decentralization. It then proposed a 
regulatory framework that targets the former and protects the 
latter, by adopting regulatory instruments that impose costs on-
ly on anonymity. Such a framework impedes the use of crypto-
 
 44 Yee, 3 Internet Pol Rev at 5 (cited in note 2). 
 45 One such project is Darkcoin. See Darkcoin, What is Darkcoin?, (2014), online at 
https://www.darkcoin.io/about/what-is-darkcoin (visited Nov 11, 2014).  
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currencies in illicit activity but allows for legitimate uses of 
cryptocurrencies. 
A full inquiry into the regulation of cryptocurrencies is  
beyond the scope of this Essay. Many important issues—such as 
regulatory-design choices, behavioral incentives, and the  
analysis of costs and benefits—remain for future research. How-
ever, the proposed framework offers a rallying point for future 
discussion on the design of regulatory instruments seeking to 
control the use of cryptocurrencies. The suggested framework 
also offers two new insights: First, it is conceivable to design 
regulatory instruments that target only the negative traits of 
cryptocurrencies while allowing positive traits to flourish. Sec-
ond, it is possible to leverage the unique nature of the public 
ledger to enlist legitimate users as passive participants in  
regulatory efforts. 
 
